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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal concerns the liability of an insurer toward an innocent third-party who
is injured as a result of the negligence of a passenger who unexpectedly grabs the steering
wheel. West American, as the subrogee of Ted Speros, obtained a judgment against
Jeffrey Hiatt. Nationwide must satisfy the judgment because it "insured" Hiatt pursuant
to section 303.
Jeffrey Hiatt was a passenger riding in a vehicle driven by Kimberly Fricke.
Nationwide acknowledged its duties toward Ms. Fricke, but it refused to defend Hiatt
despite notice and opportunity. Hiatt, as a passenger, was a permissive user of Fricke's
vehicle; therefore, Nationwide owed a duty of defend. By breaching its duty to defend,
Nationwide became liable for Hiatt's judgment even if Nationwide could have proved the
applicability of the intentional causation exclusion.
Hiatt's actions were reckless, but not "intentional" as that word should be
interpreted. Even if Hiatt's actions were intentional, the exclusion is not enforceable
because it conflicts with the requirements of Utah's mandatory liability insurance statutes.
And West American is the proper party to enforce Nationwide's obligations because its
insured (and thus it) is the third-party beneficiary of Nationwide's contract.
Alternatively, the doctrine of subrogation is broad enough to encompass this situation and
equity demands that Nationwide satisfy the judgment. If insurers were permitted to
refuse coverage, the legislative intent behind modern insurance practice would be
frustrated.
1

ARGUMENT
I.

HIATT WAS A PERMISSIVE USER AND, THUS, WAS
INSURED BY NATIONWIDE UNDER FRICKE'S POLICY.

The permissive user issue addresses the "insuring clause" which answers the
question, "Who is an insured?" Nationwide injects questions of proximate causation of
the damages suffered by Ted Speros. It points out that the concurrent (probably
predominant) proximate cause of the insured loss was Hiatt grabbing the steering wheel.
It therefore concludes that this was not part of the permissive use. This is error. The
cause of the accident is relevant to both the "coverage clause" which addresses the
question, "What is covered?" and any exclusions (i.e., What is not covered?). But Hiatt's
permissive use is very clear.
Nationwide does not genuinely dispute that Hiatt was permissively "using"
Fricke's vehicle as a passenger. Both Utah's statute and Nationwide's omnibus clause
employ the word "use." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A). Fricke's affidavit
makes it crystal clear that she gave permission to Hiatt to ride in (and, thus, "use") the
insured vehicle: "I agreed to take him home." (R. 286). Therefore, it is not disputed
that Hiatt was a permissive user — at least at some point prior to the accident. This is not
a new rule of law.
Under the omnibus clause of its insurance contract, Metropolitan
agreed to cover "any person while using the automobile * * *
provided the actual use is with * * * [the named Insured's]
permission.11 The clause says nothing about operation of the vehicle.
It is the use which must be permitted. Defendant reads the word use
as synonymous with operation, and argues that since Mrs.
2

Calandriello in effect expressly forbade Acerra from operating her
car, Acerra was not covered. We think that in this context the words
use and operation are not synonymous. The use of an automobile
denotes its employment for some purpose of the user; the word
"operation" denotes the manipulation of the car's controls in order to
propel it as a vehicle. Use is thus broader than operation. Brown v.
Kennedy, 141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Maryland Casualty Company v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637 (3 Cir.
1955). One who operates a car uses it, Cronan v. Travellers
Indemnity Co., 126N.J.L. 56 (E. & A. 1941), but one can use a car
without operating it. An automobile is being used, for example, by
one riding in it although another is driving.
Since in this context the words operation and use have different
meanings and the omnibus clause requires only that the use of the
automobile be with the permission of the named insured, any
prohibition as to the operation of the automobile is immaterial to
a determination of coverage. Thus, even though a driver has been
expressly prohibited from operating the car, he is covered if the car
was being used for a purpose permitted by the named insured. Glens
Falls Indemnity Co. v. Zurn, 87 F.2d 988 (7 Cir. 1937); Brooks v.
Delta Fire & Casualty Company, 82 So.2d 55 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
Indemnity Ins. Co.. Etc. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1960)
(addressing the initial-permission rule) (bold added).
Nevertheless, Nationwide insists (at p. 18) there is no evidence that Hiatt had
permission to use the insured vehicle. Nationwide's assertion is overly-broad. However,
that certainly does not end the debate. The debate concerns whether a passenger who is
riding in a vehicle with the permission of an insured remains a "permissive user" when
he reaches over and grabs the steering wheel. This is not, as Nationwide insists, a
question lacking in factual substance. Rather, it is a question resting on the scope of
permissive use as that term is used in Utah's expansive, compulsory insurance statutes —

3

a question of law and statutory construction. If, as it should, the Court adopts the
reasoning that issues relating to scope of use are immaterial, the analysis would then
move to questions relating to scope of coverage rather than focusing on the scope of
permissive use. Identifying insureds should not turn on the nature or cause of an
accident; rather it turns on an identity of interest with the insured vehicle and/or the
insured household.
Nationwide fails to discuss the proper legal question. Instead, it repeatedly states
that it decided not to recognize Hiatt as an insured prior to the filing of West American's
complaint. Opposition Brief at pp. 17, 21, 25, 29, etc. The alleged legal relevance of this
repeated assertion has never been made clear. Apparently, Nationwide believes its
analysis (whatever it might have been) is binding on this Court. Of course, such an
assertion would be incorrect.1
The proper analysis must proceed as follows: (1) The Court must determine what
the facts are; (2) The Court must interpret the relevant statutes and contractual terms; and
(3) The Court must properly apply the law to the facts in the following sequence: (a) the
insuring clause; (b) the coverage clause; and (c) any exclusions.
Because the facts were determined by the entry of a default and default judgment,

1

A parole board's decision is not reviewable by this Court, but there is no similar
statute applicable to an insurance company's coverage decision. If there is some merit to
Nationwide's assertion, it has never been articulated.
4

the facts are undisputed.2 Jeffrey Hiatt voluntarily (i.e., his action was not the result of
involuntary physical stimulus like a hiccup) grabbed the steering wheel of Kimberly
Fricke's car and negligently3 caused it to injure Ted Speros and damage his car.

a.

Jeffrey Hiatt's Act Was Within the Scope of "Permissive Use"

Nationwide repeatedly asserts that Kimberly Fricke did not expressly or impliedly
authorize Jeffrey Hiatt to grab her vehicle's steering wheel. That is not really disputed
because negligence is never expressly or implicitly authorized.4 It also is not the relevant
2

In addition to the facts relating to Hiatt's actions being undisputed because of the
legal effect of default, the parties only dispute the legal effects of the facts relating to this
issue and the characterization of the facts. In other words, the "factual disputes" alleged
by Nationwide are only its disagreements on the basis of semantics and legal effects.
3

Although Nationwide argues (at p. 20) that entry of default only establishes the
well-pled facts and not the legal effect, its argument is an inaccurate statement of the law.
Entry of default establishes facts, but entry of default judgment establishes the legal effect
of the facts. See Stevens v. Collard. 837 P.2d 593, 596 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also
Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope. 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998). Therefore, it is undisputed that
Jeffrey Hiatt's acts were negligent. The allegation of negligence would possibly be
covered for indemnity and, thus, the allegation triggered the duty to defend. Hiatt's
adjudicated negligence, thus, triggered Nationwide's indemnity coverage obligation
because his "legal liability" was established by the default judgment. And because
Nationwide had the opportunity to defend and refused, it is estopped from attempting to
relitigate the matter decided in accordance with well-established principles of law, and it
owes coverage even if it might have been able to escape its contractual obligation if it had
defended, filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured, and proved that
grabbing the steering wheel took Hiatt outside the scope of coverage. See, e.g.. 44 C.J.S.
Insurance § 103. This analysis is dispositive of the entire appeal. (R. 33 - 43).
4

It is common for people loaning their cars to others to say: "Don't wreck it."
Indeed, no rational person would ever hand over the keys with smile saying: "Have fun
wrecking my car!" But just because there is no express or implied permission to cause an
accident (or even in the face of a direct warning not to cause an accident) does not
transform the negligent permissive use into negligence outside the scope of permissive
5

legal issue. Hiatt was not a trespasser, therefore, he was a permissive user.
The precise legal issue is whether the legislature intended to require insurers to
provide liability coverage to a person who is a permissive user (specifically, is a
passenger) but who grabs the steering wheel and causes injury to a third person. And
coextensive with this analysis is the question of what remedy a liability carrier possesses
against a permissive user if the liability carrier can prove that the permissive user acted
with specific intent.5 If the legislative intent behind the relevant statutes requires insurers
to protect innocent victims against the above-described risk, any effort by Nationwide to
avoid the risk is void because the legislative action preempts all conditions except those
specifically permitted.
The legislature used broad terminology to identify the people to whom coverage
must be provided under compulsory automobile insurance policies. The legislature
intended to protect accident victims on Utah's public highways. Nationwide is well

use. If Nationwide's conclusion were accepted, the permissive user requirement of
section 303 would be rendered meaningless. Nationwide fails to articulate a principled
distinction between, for example, (a) a person who borrows a car and runs through a stop
sign (without express or implied permission to run through a stop sign); (b) a passenger
who slams another passenger's hand in the door; (c) a passenger who tosses an item (or
allows an item to fall) from the vehicle causing an accident; (d) a passenger who is
comparatively negligent under a failure-to-wam theory; or (e) the facts of this case.
5

Many liability policies contain a provision in the Financial Responsibility clause
reserving the right to indemnification for coverage that would not be provided in the
absence of compulsory insurance statutes requiring coverage for the benefit of third
parties. Nationwide has not reserved this right specifically in its contract, but it might
possess such a right in equity.
6

aware of the legislature's intent and it, like all other insurers, provides a financial
responsibility clause which states that the policy will be altered automatically to comply
with state law. See Opposition Brief at Exhibit 2, p. 13. Of course, even if Nationwide
did not concede this point, this Court's responsibility still would be to properly enforce
the law as it is written without deference to Nationwide's attempt to expand its rights at
the expense of innocent third-parties' statutory rights.
Because "use" is a broad term and because the legislative intent underlying section
303 (an inclusionary clause) is to protect injured third-parties (rather than insurers' profits
which are adequately protected through rate structures rather than through loop-holes or
unauthorized conditions and possibly by the right to be indemnified by insured persons
who breach contractual obligations relating to intent), the Court must give an expansive
definition that furthers legislative intent in practice. There are few, if any, Utah cases that
address this type of issue. Analogies to distinct, but similar, legal issues can be helpful in
this regard. By way of analogy, fighting can be within the course and scope of
employment because it is a method, even though a quite improper one, of promoting the
employer's business.
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal
relationship1 between the injury and the employment." Commercial
Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707, 712 (Utah.Ct.App.
1994) (quoting M& K Corp., 112 Utah at 493, 189 P.2d at 134),
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). " 'Arising out of/ "
however, does not mean that the accident must be " 'caused by'" the
employment; rather, the employment " fis thought of more as a
condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing
the event in affirmative fashion.' " Commercial Carriers, 888 P.2d at
7

712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§§ 6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise).
Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah App. 1997).
Moreover, ff[t]he controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of
the employment can be fairly said to have elicited conduct by the
employee which results in his injury.1 " Id. §§ 11.11(c), at 3-205
(citation omitted). Accordingly, when the injuries result from a
fight, the injuries may still be causally related to the employment
,f
[i]f the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled with the work
itself." Id. §§ 11.15(a), at 3-243. Because Judd was injured while
attempting to protect his cargo, we conclude that the fight was
"closely entangled" with his job as a truck driver for Commercial.
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994) (bold
added). Although it might seem like a bit of a stretch to analogize "arising out of
employment," the legal issue presented here is whether this accident "arose out of the
permissive use." The same causal nexus described above is appropriate.
Both statutory schemes reflect a legislative intent to cover an expansive set of
circumstances, and both are based on a vague phrase (except that "course and scope" has
developed a lot of elements and standards because of frequent litigation). Essentially, the
court decided it could either favor coverage for employees (and, thus, immunity for
employers — but with higher employer-paid premiums) or favor insurers by limiting their
contractual exposure. The court decided to expand coverage and corresponding immunity
rather than expanding coverage limitations.
The same type of questions should be asked in this case. Either we can presume
that anything that is not expressly permitted is not covered, or we can presume that

8

anything that is not expressly forbidden is impliedly permitted. Nationwide essentially
argues that because Fricke did not expressly grant permission to grab the steering wheel
(which is undisputed) and Fricke now claims that it was not her intent to impliedly
authorize the grabbing of the steering wheel, it must be outside the scope of permissive
use. This conclusion could only arise from a legal rule that makes compulsory liability
coverage dependent upon the unstated subjective intent of the grantor of permission.
Therefore, the limitations on the scope of permission which would exist nowhere but in
the mind of the grantor6 would be dispositive of the protection the legislature intended to
provide for innocent third parties. This cannot be the correct legal standard.
The accident in this case arose out of Hiatt's fight with Fricke. Apparently, she
offered to take him "home" and, in his altered state, he thought her "home"7 would be
better (R. 45), so he spontaneously (R. 286) grabbed the steering wheel (apparently, to
point them in the "right" direction). If the "close entanglement" test were applied to this
scenario, the permissive use (a ride home in the insured vehicle) is "closely entangled"
with Hiatt's non-trepassory, spontaneous negligence which caused Speros's injury.
Therefore, the actions taken by Hiatt should be declared to be within his permissive use
and, therefore, covered under Nationwide's liability coverage.

6

Obviously, a subjective standard is capable of giving rise to all manner of abuse.

7

This is not an argument that her offer was ambiguous; rather it bolsters the
argument that the proper legal test is whether Hiatt was a trespasser. In order for
Nationwide to have proved that Hiatt was not a permissive user in this case, it was
required to attempt to prove that he was a trespasser to personal property.
9

Rather than insisting that there was no permissive use because there was no
permission to grab the steering wheel (despite Kimberly Fricke's affidavit stating that she
offered to take him home thereby providing proof of permission to "use" the vehicle),
Nationwide's argument should have been that grabbing the steering wheel was repugnant
to the general purpose8 of the permissive use. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ryan, 547 P.2d
1340 (Utah 1976) (adopting the initial-permission rule). Although this would have been
an excellent argument, it ultimately fails for two reasons: (1) There is no debate that
Fricke had authority to permit Hiatt to use her vehicle therefore the general purpose
standard is unduly narrow; (2) This argument would have been an affirmative defense
that would have to have been pleaded and proved by Nationwide in a declaratory
judgment action in conjunction with a reservation of rights letter; therefore, the breach of
its duty to defend precludes that argument now; and (3) The permissive use requirement
of section 303 contains no conditions regarding negligent acts during the permissive use
that arguably exceed a scope of use that is never, in reality, set forth by any normal
grantor of permission. Because section 303 was adopted to protect innocent third parties

8

"General purpose" could not be much more vague. Again, any and all
negligence resulting in damages is repugnant to the general purpose behind loaning a car
to a permissive user. The result of someone's use that is inconsistent with one's
expectations (i.e., a grantor of permission who would like to avoid damages and liability)
should not be the starting point of divining the scope of a grantor's permission. Owners
never make permissive users sign detailed contracts setting forth the scope of the
permissive use. Insurance contracts, on the other hand, must fully set forth the scope of
coverage and any limitations thereon. Nationwide's insurance contract does not attempt
to limit the scope of permissive use to actions that were specifically foreseen, negotiated
and approved, and section 303 does not either.
10

from loss at the hands of uninsured motorists, it has a preemptive effect on any attempt to
invent limitations which are not set forth in section 303.9
The "close entanglement" test10 advances the legislative intent while protecting
insurers from any horribles that might be paraded. Joy-riding teenagers are not covered.
Repo-men are not covered. Stop-light hijackers are not covered. Children who throw
their toys out the window at passing vehicles while their parents blithely drive slowly in
the left-hand lane are covered. Careless11 friends (or ex-friends) who grab steering
wheels are covered.
The best analysis is acknowledging that if Hiatt had jumped into Fricke's car's
window before he grabbed the steering wheel (becoming a trespasser), Nationwide would
have been correct. But Fricke invited Hiatt into her car. (R. 286). Therefore, Hiatt was a
permissive user.

9

It is manifestly unhelpful to note that if an insurer must indemnify someone who
is a permissive user, it clearly does not have to indemnify someone who is not a
permissive user.
10

This test would be similar to the nexus requirement adopted in Viking Ins. Co.
Of Wisconsin v. Coleman. 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App. 1996) which considered the
"ownership use or maintenance" language contained in the coverage clause. If an insurer
thinks it's a close call, it should file a declaratory action requirement against the insured
and, as in that case, against the homeowners' insurance and/or other interested insurer
rather than resting on its own conclusions.
11

Intentionally grabbing the steering wheel for the purpose of intentionally
injuring a third party is also covered, but this distinction would give rise to an insurer's
right to obtain reimbursement from the offending grabber lest he be unjustly enriched.
11

II.

NATIONWIDE'S LIABILITY POLICY PROVIDES COVERAGE
FOR INSUREDS WHO "BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO
PAY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE OWNERSHIP, USE,
LOADING OR UNLOADING OF" INSURED VEHICLES.

After having determined that Hiatt was a permissive user and, thus, an insured, the
Court must determine whether the "legal liability" of Hiatt falls within Nationwide's
coverage clause. At worst, the default judgment determined Hiatt's acts to be reckless.
Recklessness is covered. The default judgment determined Hiatt's legal liability and his
liability is for the damage to property and injury to Ted Speros. Therefore, the coverage
clause undoubtedly applies, and Nationwide undoubtedly breached its reciprocal duty.
However, Nationwide points out (at p. 17) that its coverage clause also includes a
permission requirement. Nationwide's policy merely includes the insuring clause for
permissive users at the end of its coverage clause. This fact does not change the
foregoing analysis relating to who is an insured.

III.

GRABBING THE STEERING WHEEL WAS NOT AN
"INTENTIONAL ACT" UNDER THE EXCLUSION.

Step 3 involves determining (1) whether an exclusion applies, (2) whether that
exclusion is enforceable under Utah law, and (3) Whether Nationwide is estopped from
alleging the exclusion because of its failure to defend Hiatt. Nationwide's policy purports
to exclude injuries or damages which are "caused intentionally by . . . an insured."

12

IV.

GRABBING THE STEERING WHEEL WAS NOT
INTENTIONAL CAUSATION.

Together with the foregoing, the Court must bear in mind the well-settled
distinction between "accidental injuries" and "injuries by accidental means." While this
insurance policy does not limit its coverage using such terms, Nationwide's arguments
revolve around this "causation" idea. It argues that because the injury to Speros and his
property arose from grabbing the steering wheel, it was intentional. Nationwide confuses
permission and causation, and it draws an inappropriate conclusion from the mere
happening of an event.
In addition to distorting the proper standard for analyzing permissive use, these
causation ideas invoke a "foreseeability" component which is inappropriate when applied
to the initial question of "permissive use" as opposed to the analysis of an "intentional
acts exclusion"12 or a policy which limits coverage to accidental means. See Pioneer
Chlor Alkali Co. v. National Union Fire Ins.. 863 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1994)
("Proximate cause in the insurance context is essentially the same as proximate cause in
the negligence context,. . . except foreseeability is not an element."). While
foreseeability has nothing to do with an insured's duty to provide a proof of loss, it can be
applied to an exclusion. In fact, the only terms of the contract which might provide

12

The Court must remember that an insured bears the burden of demonstrating
that the loss comes within coverage pursuant to the procedures which must be set forth by
the insurer in writing. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-21-106, 312. But the insurer bears
the burden of affirmatively proving the applicability of an exclusion.
13

justification for addressing a causation issue is the intentional acts exclusion. Because
Nationwide bore the burden of attempting to prove its assertions and because it failed and
refused to bear its burden, there is no dispute that it may not attempt to relitigate that
which was settled by the default judgment and the absence of a declaratory judgment
action.
Nevertheless, a review of distinctions bearing on intentional causation might be
helpful.
If death or injury is the unexpected or unintentional result of
some act, although voluntarily done by deceased or the person
injured, it is an accidental death or injury; but, if death or injury
results from an act which was unforeseen or unintentionally done by
deceased or the person injured, it is death or injury by accidental
means.
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 753(b). Hiatt did not intend to hit Speros. The injury to Speros
was entirely unplanned. Hiatt's voluntary act of grabbing the steering wheel does not
render his actions intentional.
It is settled that shooting a gun in someone's direction not an accidental means.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1994) (granting State
Farm a declaratory judgment that its intentional acts exclusion applied and holding that
shooting a gun at someone gives rise to an inference of intent). The justifications for
adopting the analysis of presumed intent in homeowners' coverage where the subject
matter is gunplay are not appropriate in the context of an automobile accident injuring an
innocent third party.
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Automobile accidents happen all the time because of voluntary actions that result
in accidents. Someone who tries, but fails, to cross a busy street while driving a Hyundai
cannot be presumed to intend the natural result of his or her actions if they recklessly
thought they could make it in time. Crossing would be voluntary, and the Hyundai
driver's delusions of acceleration-potential could be criticized. But that does not make
the accidents they cause into "intentional acts." It cannot be used as a justification for
exposing innocent accident victims to untold amounts of uninsured losses.

V.

NATIONWIDE'S INTENTIONAL CAUSATION EXCLUSION IS
NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST VICTIMS.

Nationwide's exclusion is not enforceable against West American (i.e., the
subrogee of Ted Speros). Automobile insurance is mandatory under the law because the
legislature decided that insurance was necessary for the protection of the public.13
In other words, the legislature intended to partially "occupy the field." Any
limitation on coverage that is not permitted explicitly or implicitly is preempted by
section 303. Section 303 provides for some limitations. None of those explicit
limitations are applicable to this case.
Therefore, the second step involves determining if the intentional causation clause

13

Mandatory automobile insurance was adopted in order to protect the members
of the driving public who are injured: "This legislative action [addition of the no-fault
statute to the safety responsibility act] reflected a public policy requiring minimum
coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents." Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Call 712 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1985).
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interferes with the legislative intent. The legislative intent was to protect innocent victims
through requiring all motorists to maintain liability coverage. If an insurer attempts to
avoid contractual liability through denying an innocent victim access to the tortfeasor's
liability coverage, this is contrary to legislative intent.14 Because it is contrary to
legislative intent, it is preempted.
Nationwide argues that Speros had collision coverage. This is true. An innocent
victim may choose to obtain insurance to cover himself in the event that (a) he is at fault,
or (b) a tortfeasor violates the law by driving without insurance. Ted Speros did not
purchase collision coverage to protect Nationwide against the risk that Nationwide might
subjectively determine that its insured's actions were intentional. If Nationwide were
permitted to invent all manner of exclusions to benefit itself at the expense of innocent
victims, insurers like West American could not accurately estimate risk and set premiums.
Preemption of all exclusions not specifically permitted keeps premiums low by increasing
the accuracy of actuarial predictions and the efficacy of underwriting guidelines.
Moreover, the existence of collision coverage does not, as Nationwide insists (at p.
28), shift the equities or affect the operation of section 303. The purchase of collision
coverage for additional protection against calamity is not contrary to the legislative goal
of protecting innocent victims from uninsured motorists. That just means it is not
preempted by Utah's insurance code. Moreover, collision coverage acts as substitute

14

Of course, this presumes that the person is first found to be an insured.
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liability coverage — from an equitable standpoint.
If property damage were designed as a no-fault system in which recovery from the
first-party carrier was an essential element of the statutory scheme, Nationwide would be
correct. However, because the common law has only been modified to the extent that
liability coverage, among others, is mandatory, Nationwide's argument fails. Its
intentional causation exclusion also fails.
West American has advised Nationwide that its exclusion is not completely void.
Nationwide can attempt to enforce its exclusion against its insured — Hiatt. Nationwide
chose not to take advantage of its remedy. This remedy probably would not violate
legislative intent because it would encourage actions which are consistent with legislative
intent. But Nationwide's refusal to attempt to avail itself of this potential remedy does
not destroy or affect West American's rights which it received from Ted Speros.15

VI.

BECAUSE NATIONWIDE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
DEFEND HIATT, BUT REFUSED, THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
AGAINST HIM IS BINDING ON NATIONWIDE.

Nationwide confuses its obligations with Kimberly Fricke's obligations.
Nationwide correctly argues that Kimberly Fricke's rights were not affected by the
default judgment. But Nationwide errs when it insists (at pp. 20-21) that its contractual
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Subrogation has been defined as: "[T]he right of the insurer to be put in the
position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to
the insured for a loss paid by the insurer." 16 George J. Couch, Couch Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law §61:1 (2ded. 1983).
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obligation to answer for the legal liability of Hiatt is not triggered by the trial court's
entry of a judgment imposing legal liability on Hiatt for the use of an automobile insured
by Nationwide.
The law is clear that if an insurer refuses to defend its insured, it cannot rely on
exclusions or coverage limits. Nationwide does not dispute this rule of law. Instead, it
argues that Hiatt was not its insured. West American concedes that if there is no duty to
defend, of course the above-stated rule does not apply. But what Nationwide ignores is
that the duty to defend arises from the allegations contained in the complaint. If
Nationwide disagrees with the allegations, it is permitted to defend with a reservation of
rights. There is some authority for the proposition that its reservation of rights can
require reimbursement for defense costs in the event the courts determine that the
defendant is not an insured. See, generally, Texas Ass'n of Counties Govt. Risk Mgmt.
Pool v. Matagorda County. 52 S.W.3d 128 (TX 2001). Nationwide also ignores the fact
that it is certainly permitted to refuse to do anything, but by choosing to do nothing and
by simply relying on its own conclusion and failing to obtain the benefit of a judgment in
court, it risked losing its defenses and exposing itself to greater liability than it otherwise
might have had in the event the Court now determines that its conclusions were wrong.
In this case, Nationwide could only escape liability by this Court's determination
that there was "no possibility" that Hiatt was an insured. If, and only if, the Court
determines that there was "no possibility" of coverage can the Court ratify Nationwide's
conclusion or excuse it from the obligation to pay the judgment entered against Hiatt. If
18

however, the allegations in the complaint gave rise to a possibility of liability which
would fall within the parameters of its indemnity coverage, Nationwide must answer for
the default judgment regardless of whether or not the intentional causation exclusion
applies to the facts and is enforceable.

VII.

WEST AMERICAN HAS STANDING TO COMPEL
NATIONWIDE TO PERFORM ITS DUTIES.

Nationwide does not dispute (at p. 28) that the lack of privity does not shield it
under the doctrine of subrogation.16 Instead it states the general principle that there must
be some duty to pay a debt and that equity does not enlarge obligations. West American
does not quarrel with these general propositions; however, they do not apply to this case
either. Nationwide has a clear duty to pay the legal liability of its insured. If this Court
agrees that Hiatt was Nationwide's insured, there is ample basis for requiring Nationwide
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Nationwide does raise some implied objection to the characterization of "privity
of contract" as "banal," and perhaps a more bland term should have been used and a bit of
brevity should have been sacrificed. However, it is a proper word that should not offend
the sensibilities of anybody. "Banality" and "platitude" are synonyms. Privity of
contract is important in many contractual situations. For example, the duty of good faith
only attaches to parties to a contract or their privies and, generally, only parties, privies
and third-party beneficiaries have standing to enforce the contract. But just because
"privity of contract" is appropriate under some circumstances does not mean it is
appropriate in every circumstance. When it is applied to a situation where the doctrine
does not fit, its use is "banal" — not because it is never true, but rather because it is not
true in this case. Nevertheless, the use of the word is hereby explained, retracted and
apologized for in order to avoid any distractions. Plaintiffs should have said something
like: "Privity of contract," under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, "is a
straw man analytical framework that permits one to justify a predetermined outcome."
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 at ^f 89 (Wilkins, J. concurring and dissenting).
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to pay the judgment entered against Hiatt. Therefore, the only question that must be
answered in order to satisfy equity and to justify standing is whether Hiatt was a
"permissive user" as that term is used in section 303.
Although Nationwide claims (at p. 29) that West American is raising the issue of
PIP reimbursement for the first time, it is mistaken. For example, West American raised
this claim in its complaint. (R. 7).

VIII. WEST AMERICAN AND ITS INSURED ARE THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARIES OF NATIONWIDE'S CONTRACT.
Mandatory liability insurance policies are for the protection of innocent victims.
Therefore, innocent victims are third-party beneficiaries of automobile liability policies
who may directly enforce a contract to which they are not parties.
In order for one to be a third-party beneficiary, one must demonstrate that there is
some provision in the contract that operates to his benefit.
Where the contract creates a right in favor of a third person, the law
presumes that the party to the contract intended to confer benefits on
the third person and the third party beneficiary has the right to
enforce the contract although the contract also works to the
advantage of the parties thereto and although the actual purpose
motivating the parties in making the provisions in favor of the third
party was a purely selfish one of benefitting or protecting themselves
rather than of benefitting the third person.
Black and White Cabs of St. Louis. Inc. v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Mo. App. 1963).
There is no question that Speros and his subrogee are specifically intended to be protected
by Nation wide's contract. It is certainly true that Fricke bought the contract to protect
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herself from liability and Nationwide issued it to make a profit. The only relevant point is
that the contract was specifically created for the benefit of injured third persons.
The promise, in such a situation, is treated as having been made
directly to the third party; the third-party beneficiary is said to obtain
a vested right as against the promisor. So it has been held that when
a third-party beneficiary institutes an action under a third-party
beneficiary contract, he does not sue on an independent contract, but
rather rests his action on a contract made for his benefit, and that he
may enforce the contract against either the promisor or the promisee.
17A C.J.S. Insurance §519(3).
Nationwide itself recognizes that non-parties are authorized to enforce its contract;
however, Nationwide limits the right of the third party because its liability is contingent
upon the liability of its insured. Courts have agreed to enforce this limitation on
third-parties' rights. The limitation is known as a "no-action" clause. In Nationwide's
policy, the no-action clause reads as follows:
Under the liability coverages of this policy, no legal action may be
brought against the company until judgment against the insured has
been finally determined after trial.
Opposition Brief at Exhibit 2, p. 15 (bold in original, italics added). The no-action clause
is enforceable because the victim is getting what he is entitled to whenever the insurer
defends its insured and indemnifies the insured for coverage limits for the insured's legal
liability. The contract conditions actions against it with the qualifier "until." Once the
"until" clause is satisfied,17 the contract itself concedes the right of third parties to bring

17

Although the no-action clause says "after trial," it would be too clever by half to
permit an insurer to both refuse to perform and simultaneously demand complete
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actions against Nationwide.
Direct actions should be barred against insurers by third parties so long as the
insurer complies with its duties, and the principle upon which that conclusion should rest
is because the no-action clause is enforceable. When, as here, the insurer refuses to
perform its role, it makes no sense to permit the insurer to shield itself by reference to a
clause in the contract which it breached.
In this case, West American has a judgment against Nationwide's insured. It
therefore became a "creditor beneficiary" because Nationwide's "performance of the
promise [to pay the legal liability of Hiatt] will satisfy an actual (or supposed) or asserted
duty of the promisee [Hiatt] to the beneficiary [Speros or his subrogee]." Kelly v.
Richards. 83 P.2d 731 (Utah 1938) (cited in Mel Trimble Real Estate V. Fitzgerald. 626
P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) (cited in Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah
1993))): see also U.S. v. United Services Auto. Ass'n. 968 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing United States as third-party beneficiary under Kansas no-fault coverage
because insurer's policy provided for payment of benefits "to or on behalf of the insured
and thus clearly identified "persons other than the insured").

compliance with a term which its own breach made unnecessary.
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IX.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
COMPELS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE NOTICE WAS
ADEQUATE.

Rule 3(d) inexorably leads to the conclusion that although the Notice of Appeal
may not have been perfect, the jurisdictional requirements of (1) payment of the fee, and
(2) timely filing were satisfied. Every other part of Rule 3 is to be liberally construed.
The general rule is as follows:
There is no requirement under this rule [3(d)] that an appellant
must indicate that the appeal also concerns intermediate orders
or events that have led to that final judgment. We specifically held
in Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1994),
that the language of rule 3(d) did not require a party appealing
from an entire final judgment "to specify each interlocutory
order of which the appellant seeks review." See also Professional
Sponsoring Fund, Inc. v. Rao, 5 Haw.App. 382 694 P.2d 885, 886 n.
1 (1985) ("When an appellant files a notice of appeal from a final
judgment, he may, in his opening brief, challenge all nonfinal
prior orders and happenings which led up to that final
judgment.").
Zion's First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr.. Inc.. 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997)
(emphasis added).
To the extent that actual notice might fail as a result of technical defects, as
Nationwide argues (at pp. 10-11), there is not even an allegation of the lack of actual
notice. Instead, there is an attempt to deflect the Court's attention from the merits.
Finally, Nationwide claims that the alleged technical failure to list the orders
relating to it render the notice defective. It claims (at p. 11) this is true because the claims
against it "were entirely separate." Opposition Brief at p. 11. Nationwide is absolutely,
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positively correct that the two issues are "entirely separate."
This is the reason why West American filed a Rule 54(b) motion. But at that time,
Nationwide claimed that the claims were "not" separate. (R. 259-265). Although
Nationwide is right the second time, it is estopped from "blowing hot and cold." The
doctrine of judicial estoppel "seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position [that is]
inconsistent, conflicts with, or is contrary to one that [he or] she has previously asserted
in the same or in a previous proceeding." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §§ 74; see
also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996) ("'[A]
person may not, to the prejudice of another person deny any position taken in a prior
judicial proceeding between the same person . . . involving the same subject-matter, if
such prior position was successfully maintained.'" (citation omitted.)).

X.

FRICKE'S NEGLIGENCE IS A QUESTION OF FACT.

Nationwide filed a motion claiming that the facts were undisputed. It supported its
motion with an affidavit. The "facts" set forth in that affidavit were conclusively
established because West American failed to provide a counter-affidavit. However, the
"conclusions" and "arguments" in that affidavit should have been stricken. Because the
evidence presented was in the form of a written affidavit, this Court owes no deference to
the trial court's decision to admit the statements which West American characterizes as
conclusory and argumentative. The admissibility of the "suddenness" and
"unforeseeability" of events, for example, should be reviewed for correctness.
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Nationwide argues that Rule 56(e) required counter-affidavits. That is an incorrect
statement of the law. A party moving for summary judgment must prove (a) the absence
of genuine disputes as to any material fact, AND (b) that it is entitled to a summary
judgment as a matter of law. A responding party can file counter-affidavits, or it can
demonstrate that the moving party failed as to either (a) or (b). The counter-affidavit
requirement only means that a party may not rely on pleadings. It does not mean that the
responding party cannot attack the moving party's non-fulfillment of its responsibilities in
order to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiffs properly demonstrated that the affidavit of
Kimberly Fricke failed to demonstrate a lack of genuine dispute as to the facts of the
accident. The arguments Plaintiffs made were not based on speculation, rather Plaintiffs
demonstrated that reasonable inferences could be drawn by the jury.

CONCLUSION
The district court's judgment should be reversed. An order should be entered in
favor of Plaintiffs stating that Nationwide must satisfy the judgment entered against
Jeffrey Hiatt.
DATED this s

^

day of November, 2002.
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